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Abstract 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. Although many 
issues shaped the Brexit campaign, the question of Turkey’s quest for EU membership 
emerged as an unexpectedly strong factor. This article examines how this happened and 
how the debate evolved. It shows that those who advocated leaving the EU not only 
distorted the prospect of Turkish membership, they also misrepresented British support 
for the country’s accession. While the UK had indeed been a strong advocate of 
Turkey’s EU integration in the past, support for enlargement in general had declined in 
recent years due to increasing voter concerns over immigration. However, the policy of 
supporting Turkish membership could not be wholly repudiated by the government, 
even in the name of campaigning to stay in the EU, as this would have damaged 
Britain’s strategic relationship with Turkey. 




While the topic of European Union enlargement has attracted significant academic 
interest over the years, the way in which it has shaped the domestic political debate in 
member states remains under-examined.1 This is perhaps unsurprising. EU matters 
have traditionally tended to rank low on voters’ lists of concerns; even in countries with 
strong Eurosceptic tendencies, such as Britain.2 However, the major enlargement of the 
EU in 2004, coupled with the financial collapse and then the refugee crisis, saw this 
change. As immigration became an increasingly important issue for voters,3 many EU 
member states saw a rise in populism and nationalism.4 In the United Kingdom, the 
debate over immigration became intertwined with the free movement of workers – one 
of the core principle of the European Union. The future expansion of the EU, which 
would see the addition of many more millions of new workers, necessarily meant that 
enlargement became inextricably linked to the immigration debate.5 
 
On 23 June 2016, Britain held a referendum on its continued membership of the 
European Union. It was the country’s largest ever exercise in direct democracy and 
resulted in a narrow win (52 percent) for those who wanted Britain to leave the EU – a 
policy that had come to be known as ‘Brexit’. During the campaign, debate raged 
                                                     
1 For an exception, see Balfour and Stratulat, EU Member States and Enlargement Towards the 
Balkans. 
2 IPSOS-MORI run regular polls identifying voter concerns on key issues. Even as late as May 2014, 
the EU failed to register in the top 10 on the Issues Index. In June 2014, it emerged as eighth on the list 
(up six places), with 12 per cent of respondents citing it as the most important issue facing Britain 
today. < https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3410/EconomistIpsos-
MORI-June-2014-Issues-Index.aspx > (Last accessed 27 March 2017).  
3 D’Angelo and Kofman, ‘UK: Large-Scale Immigration and the Challenge to EU Free Movement’. 
4 Vieten and Poynting, ‘Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe’. 
5 Kahanec et al. ‘The Free Movement of Workers in an Enlarged European Union’. 
around a variety of issues. For the Remain campaign, the primary focus was the 
economy. For the Leave campaign, two main themes came to dominate. The first was 
sovereignty. Under the claim of ‘take back control’, the EU was presented as an 
undemocratic body that subverted the will of the British people.6 The second was 
immigration. Freedom of movement was not only presented as a challenge to Britain’s 
public services and social welfare systems, it was portrayed as a threat to the country’s 
social cohesion and the national sense of identity.7 In this context, the prospect of 
Turkish membership of the EU emerged as a central issue. The Leave campaign 
repeatedly emphasised that Turkey, with strong British support, was on the cusp of 
joining the EU and that this would lead to millions of new migrants arriving in Britain. 
Although these claims were consistently challenged by the Remain campaign, the 
question of Turkey’s EU membership was prevalent throughout the campaign. 
 
This article explores how and why Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership featured so 
prominently in the Brexit referendum campaign. It starts by examining Turkey’s 
relationship with the EU and that although Turkish membership remains the official 
policy of the European Union, there is little if any prospect that it will happen in 
anything other than the long term, if ever. It is certainly not on the verge of membership, 
as the Leave campaign claimed. Next, it analyses the United Kingdom’s attitudes 
towards EU enlargement and towards Turkey’s membership of the EU. Although 
Britain has a reputation as being a champion of enlargement, it is shown that there had 
been a marked change in British support for the policy since 2013. This was driven by 
growing concerns over immigration and freedom of movement. Consequently, while 
Britain continued to support Turkish membership of EU, this support was far less 
pronounced than once was the case. Finally, the article explores the way in which 
                                                     
6 For a critique of the sovereignty argument, see Niblett, ‘Britain, the EU and the Sovereignty Myth’. 
7 Calhoun, ‘Brexit is a Mutiny against the Cosmopolitan Elite’. Other issues raised by the leave 
campaign was the size of Britain’s contribution to the EU and suggestions that the EU was planning to 
create a European army. 
Turkey’s membership featured in the Brexit referendum and how the claims made about 
its membership were tackled by those advocating continued British membership of EU. 
 
European Enlargement and Turkey 
Turkey has had a long and complex relationship with the European Union.8 Having 
concluded an association agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1963, it formally applied to join the European Community on April 14, 1987. Two 
years later, the European Commission concluded that it would be ‘inappropriate’ to 
start new accession talks at that stage due to the wider changes taking place in Europe 
and the economic and political situation in Turkey.9 Although Turkey and the European 
Union concluded a customs union in 1995, membership prospects remained dim, not 
least because of ongoing bilateral tensions with Greece.10 Following a thaw in relations 
with Athens, Turkey finally became a candidate for membership in December 1999.11 
 
The election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in November 2002, saw a 
significant improvement in Turkey’s EU accession prospects. Emphasising that its 
strategic priority was to pursue EU accession, the new Turkish government actively 
supported a UN reunification plan for Cyprus, in April 2004. In December 2004, the 
EU finally proposed the start of formal accession talks with Turkey.12 These started on 
October 3, 2005. On June 12, 2006, Turkey opened, and provisionally closed, Chapter 
25 of the acquis communautiare, the EU’s body of laws, covering Science and 
Research. However, just months later, EU foreign ministers decided that eight of the 
                                                     
8 There is an extensive literature of Turkish-EU relations. For some of the more recent works see 
Rumford, New Perspectives on Turkey-RU Relations; Yesilada, EU-Turkey Relations in the 21st 
Century. 
9 ‘Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community’, Commission of the 
European Communities, SEC(89) 2290 final/2, 20 December 1989. 
10 Altunısık and Tür, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change, p.120. 
11 ‘Preparing for Enlargement’, paragraph 12, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Helsinki European Council, 
10 and 11 December 1999. 
12 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 2004. 
EU’s 35 chapters would not be opened, and no more chapters would be provisionally 
closed, until Turkey agreed to open its ports and airports to Cypriot flagged vessels.13 
Notwithstanding this setback, between 2005 and 2010, 13 other chapters were opened.14 
The country also made many important internal reforms needed for EU membership. 
The role of the military in domestic politics was steadily reduced.15 Steps were also 
taken to grant increased rights to the country’s ethnic Kurdish community.16 
 
Despite this, Turkey still faced many significant impediments. EU leaders remained 
adamant that there could be no membership without a solution to the Cyprus Problem. 
Meanwhile, across the EU, public opinion remained largely hostile to Turkish 
accession.17 Austria even announced that it would not permit Turkey to join without 
first holding a referendum.18 Likewise, Turkey’s enthusiasm for membership began to 
wane. There was deep disillusionment at the way in which the EU failed to keep to its 
commitments to the Turkish Cypriots after their vote for reunification.19 There were 
also signs that Turkey’s accession reforms were slowing.20 However, Turkey’s 
prospects of joining the EU began to recede dramatically after May 2012. In response 
to mass demonstrations against the growing authoritarianism of then Prime Minister 
                                                     
13 Council of the European Union, Press Release, 2770th Council Meeting, General Affairs and 
External Relations, Brussels, 11 December 2006. The chapters were: 1. Free Movement of Goods; 3. 
Right of Establishment for Companies and Freedom to Provide Services; 9. Financial Services; 11. 
Agriculture and Rural Development; 13. Fisheries; 14. Transport Policy; 29. Customs Union; 30. 
External Relations. 
14 In order of opening: Chapter 25, Science and Research, 12 June 2006 (Provisionally closed the same 
day); Chapter 20, Enterprise and Industrial Policy, 29 March 2007; Chapter 18, Statistics, 25 June 
2007; Chapter 32, Financial Control, 26 July 2007; Chapter 21, Trans-European Networks, 19 
December 2007; Chapter 28, Consumer and Health Protection, 19 December 2007; Chapter 6, 
Company Law, 17 June 2008; Chapter 7, Intellectual Property Law, 17 June 2008; Chapter 4, Free 
Movement of Capital, 19 December 2008; Chapter 10, Information Society and Media, 19 December 
2008; Chapter 16, Taxation, 30 June 2009; Chapter 27, Environment and Climate Change, 21 
December 2009; Chapter 12, Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy, 30 June 2010. 
15 Güney, ‘Europeanization of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey. 
16 Cengiz and Hoffman, ‘Rethinking Conditionality’. 
17 ‘Europeans reject Turkey, poll shows’, The Guardian, 19 July 2005. In France, support for Turkish 
membership stood at just 16 per cent. In Germany, it was 21 per cent. Barysch, ‘What European Think 
about Turkey and Why’. 
18 ‘Austria signals referendum on Turkey’s EU accession’, Euractiv, August 25, 2008. 
19 Akgün and Tiryaki, ‘A Forgotten Promise: Ending the Isolation of the Turkish Cypriots’. 
20 Patton, ‘AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey’. 
Erdoğan, the government cracked down on dissent. Access to social media was 
repeatedly blocked,21 and many opposition media organisations were closed.22 Efforts 
to end the long-standing Kurdish conflict came to an end.23 Criticism of Turkey grew 
significantly within the EU. Many began to argue that under its current course Turkey 
simply could not hope to meet the Copenhagen criteria for political freedom that forms 
the cornerstone of any EU membership bid.24 Even Turkey recognised that the prospect 
of membership appeared to be receding.25 Just one new chapter was opened between 
2011 and the end of 2015.26 
 
The emergence of the refugee crisis, in summer 2015, necessitated a thawing of 
relations between Turkey and the EU. Desperate to stem the flow of over a million 
refugees into Europe, EU leaders agreed to open two new chapters.27 However, it was 
clearly a decision based on political expediency, rather than the country’s suitability for 
membership.28 Within the EU, there was no longer an appetite to see Turkey join. 
Similarly, in Turkey there was increasing reluctance to pursue EU membership in any 
meaningful way. While Erdoğan, who was now president, benefitted from being able 
to give the impression that Turkey’s accession process remained on track, it was 
increasingly accepted that he saw little value in a process that would inevitably put him 
under closer political scrutiny and force him to step back from his authoritarianism. He 
                                                     
21 ‘Turkey social media ban raises censorship fears’, BBC News, April 7, 2015 
22 ‘Turkey: Freedom of the Press 2016’, Freedom House < https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2016/turkey > (Last accessed 20 October 2016); Ranked 151/180 in 2016 ‘World Press Freedom 
Index’, Reporters without Borders < https://rsf.org/en/turkey > (Last accessed, 20 October 2016). 
23 Göksel, ‘A New Cycle Begins in Turkey-PKK Conflict’. 
24 ‘Erdogan’s Turkey has no place in the EU, say MEPs’, Euractiv, June 13, 2013. Standing for the 
Presidency of the European Commission, in 2014, Jean Claude Juncker stated that, ‘the country is 
clearly far away from EU membership. A government that blocks twitter is certainly not ready for 
accession.’ ‘My Foreign Policy Objectives’, Jean Claude Juncker, April 23, 2014 < 
http://juncker.epp.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/nodes/en_03_fp.pdf > (Last accessed July 14, 
2017). 
25 ‘Turkey ‘will probably never be EU member’, The Telegraph, September 21, 2013. 
26 Chapter 22, Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments, November 5, 2013. 
27 Chapter 17, Economic and Monetary Policy, December 14, 2015; Chapter 33, Financial and 
Budgetary Provision, June 30, 2016. 
28 Guy Verhofstadt, ‘This Turkish deal is illegal and betrays Europe’s values’, The Guardian, March 
10, 2016. 
was increasingly happy to take a very different course when its own wishes diverged 
from those of the EU.29 While Turkey remained a candidate for EU membership, by 
2016 few believed that this would happen in anything other than the long term.30 
 
British Government support for EU enlargement and Turkish membership 
Traditionally, the United Kingdom has been regarded as the strongest proponent of EU 
expansion.31 Driving this support was the underlying wish of successive British 
governments to shape the process of European integration. Fearful of a real or perceived 
desire by other EU members to create an ever-deeper political union, perhaps with the 
end goal of creating a federal Europe, Britain came to see enlargement as the best way 
to avert this process.32 To this end, Britain strongly supported the accession of ten 
Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, as well as the subsequent membership 
of Bulgaria and Romania, in 2007, and Croatia, in 2013.33 
 
Just as the United Kingdom had long supported EU enlargement in general terms, the 
British government also became an ardent supporter of Turkish membership.34 In the 
context of the wider goal of preventing closer EU political integration, Turkey was long 
seen to be the most valuable prize of all. Britain believed that the accession of such a 
                                                     
29 Yilmaz, ‘From Europeanization to De-Europeanization’. As he told the EU, in May 2016, in 
response to calls by the EU for his government to change controversial new anti-terrorism legislation: 
‘we’ll go our way, you go yours.’ ‘EU-Turkey visa deal on brink as Erdoğan refuses to change terror 
laws’, The Guardian, May 6, 2016; ‘Turkey's long road to EU membership just got longer’, The 
Guardian, July 20, 2016. 
30 ‘Turkey in no position to become EU member any time soon: Juncker’, Reuters, July 25, 2016. 
31 ‘The Future of EU Enlargement’, European Union Committee, House of Lords, Tenth Report of 
Session 2012-13. 
32 Grant, Europe’s Blurred Boundaries. This approach was perhaps most neatly captured in an episode 
of the classic British political comedy, Yes Minister. In one scene, Jim Hacker, the fictional Minister of 
Administrative Affairs, discusses Britain’s relationship with the then European Economic Community 
(EEC) with his chief civil servant, Sir Humphrey Appleby. Sir Humphrey explains that for the past 500 
years Britain has had one key policy objective: to create a disunited ‘Europe’. Hacker then asks why, if 
that is the case, Britain had been pushing for more members. Sir Humphrey replies, “the more 
members it has, the more arguments it can stir up, the more futile and impotent it becomes.” Yes 
Minister, ‘The Devil You Know’, Series 2, Episode 5, 1982. 
33 Ker-Lindsay, ‘The United Kingdom’, p.54 
34 For an overview of British attitudes towards Turkish EU membership, see ‘UK-Turkey relations and 
Turkey's regional role’, Foreign Affairs Committee, 12th Report, House of Commons, 2012. 
large country, which also held strong views on national sovereignty, would necessarily 
halt federalist trends within the EU.35 For this reason, London consistently argued in 
favour of maintaining a realistic accession prospect for the country.36 Under the centre-
left New Labour administration (1997-2010), the United Kingdom actively supported 
Turkish candidacy in 1999, as well as the opening of accession talks, in 2005. While 
French and German politicians have over the years expressed their reservations about 
the Turkish EU entry,37 although often deciding not to upset Turkey by rejecting 
membership out of hand, British political figures from across the political spectrum 
consistently expressed their strongest support for Turkish accession.38 This was also 
matched by closer economic and political cooperation. In October 2007, the United 
Kingdom and Turkey signed a major ‘strategic partnership’.39  
 
Despite strong governmental support for enlargement and Turkish membership, the 
British public was rather less enthusiastic. A May 2006 Eurobarometer showed that just 
49 percent of British respondents thought that the enlargement of the EU was 
‘something positive’, as compared to 55 percent across the EU-27. This put the UK 
below Sweden (66), Belgium (64), Ireland (62), Netherlands (61), Italy (59), and 
Germany (52).40 On Turkish membership, a Eurobarometer published the following 
year showed support ran at just 30 percent, with 52 percent against. Although this was 
rather better than many other leading EU members – for example, the same figures were 
                                                     
35 MacLennan, ‘The EU-Turkey Negotiations, p.24. 
36 Wallace, ‘The UK: 40 Years of EU Membership’, p.542. 
37 Barysch, ‘What Europeans Think About Turkey and Why’. 
38 ‘Blair pledges to champion Turkey's entry to EU’, The Independent, May 17, 2004; ‘Turkey's future 
lies in EU, says Blair’, The Guardian, September 30, 2005; ‘Blair warns of sending wrong signal to 
Turkey on EU bid’, International Herald Tribune, November 29, 2006; ‘UK vows to Back Turkey’s 
EU Bid’, BBC News, September 5, 2007;  
39 The agreement, which can no longer be found on the British Government’s website, came in for 
considerable criticism as it appeared to support direct links between the United Kingdom and the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which unilaterally declared independence in 1983 and 
which is only recognised by Tukey. This inclusion of a direct reference to the TRNC caused a major 
rift in UK-Cyprus relations, and was raised in the British Parliament: ‘Cyprus and the Strategic 
Partnership with Turkey’, Early Day Motion 93, House of Commons, November 6, 2007. 
40 Special Eurobarometer, ‘The Future of Europe’, European Commission, May 2006. 
25/60 in Italy, 22/69 in France, 16/78 and 5/87 in Austria – it hardly showed strong 
popular support for the government’s policy in favour of Turkish membership.41 
 
Despite the cool public attitudes towards enlargement and Turkish membership, the 
arrival of a Conservative-led government, in May 2010, at first seemed to herald a 
continuation of British support for Turkey’s EU membership. In July 2010, Prime 
Minister David Cameron, told an audience in Ankara that he was, ‘the strongest 
possible advocate’ of Turkish membership.42 At the same time, concerted efforts were 
made to expand bilateral British-Turkish relations in the context of a renewed ‘Strategic 
Partnership’.43 In the years that followed, London continued to support Turkish 
accession.44 However, such statements appeared to ring increasingly hollow. Despite 
Britain’s strong reputation for supporting enlargement, support for further expansion in 
fact waned after 2010. This was driven by a growing debate over immigration.  
 
The immigration debate and the path to the referendum 
As well as being a long-standing champion of expanding the membership of the EU, 
Britain was also one of the strongest proponents of freedom of movement for new 
member states. In 2004, it was one of the few EU15 member states that decided to 
waive the seven year transitional restrictions on freedom of movement for the ten new 
members. Originally, it was projected that the number of arrivals from the new member 
states would be 13,000-15,000 per year.45 The actual numbers vastly exceeded this. 
According Home Office figures, 600,000 workers had registered by the summer of 
                                                     
41 QA33.13, Eurobarometer 66, European Commission, September 2007. 
42 David Cameron, speech in Ankara, July 27, 2010, via Number 10 website (www.number10.gov.uk). 
43 ‘UK-Turkey Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role’, Twelfth Report, Foreign Affairs Committee, 
March 20, 2012, paras.10-15. 
44 ‘David Cameron welcomes Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’, Cabinet Office, July 
30, 2012. < https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-cameron-welcomes-turkish-prime-
minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan > (Last accessed July 14, 2017). ‘David Cameron: I still want Turkey to 
join EU, despite migrant fears’, The Telegraph, December 9, 2014. 
45 ‘‘Nearly 600,000’ new EU migrants’, BBC News, August 22, 2006. 
2006.46 As a result, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, in 2007, Britain 
imposed seven year transitional restrictions on the freedom of movement for both 
countries.47 This did little to stem the flow from the 2004 members. In the year to June 
2013, the month before Croatia’s accession, net migration from the EU reached 
182,000.48 Croatia therefore also faced controls when it joined the Union.49 
 
The arrivals of larger than expected number from the EU saw the broader question of 
immigration become more prominent in British political debate.50 British public 
opinion – encouraged by a media that was dominated by newspapers that took a 
distinctly Eurosceptic line51 – became increasingly concerned about the demographic 
implications of further EU expansion. Support for further EU enlargement was now 
running at just 33 percent.52 Such fears were further exacerbated by the imminent end 
of transitional controls on Bulgarians and Romanians, on January 1, 2014. Faced with 
a growing threat from the hard-right, anti-immigration, Eurosceptic UK Independence 
Party (UKIP),53 the Conservative Party now moderated its previous support for 
                                                     
46 ‘European Union, Fifty-Third Report, European Union Select Committee, House of Lords, para.86. 
47 For a full outline of the restriction imposed see Melanie Gower and Oliver Hawkins, ‘Ending of 
transitional restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian workers’, House of Commons Library, November 
29, 2013. 
48 ‘Net migration into UK increases - Office for National Statistics’, BBC News, November 28, 2013. 
49 Melanie Gower, ‘Croatian nationals’ rights to live and work in the UK after joining the EU’, House 
of Commons Library, July 15, 2013. 
50 Duffy and Frere-Smith, Perception and Reality: Public Attitudes to Immigration. 
51 Of the mainstream British newspapers, The Sun, The Mail, The Express, and The Daily Telegraph 
all took a generally Eurosceptic line. (Although the Mail on Sunday eventually supported a vote to 
remain in the EU.) The Independent and The Guardian are generally seen to be pro-European. 
However, the degree to which they drive opposition to the European Union was contested. ‘It would be 
a mistake to conflate the role of the press in reporting European Union affairs with wider economic, 
social and political developments which feed criticism and cynicism about the EU. The British media 
reflects rather than creates popular attitudes although it does so through the distorting prism of a 
massive magnifying glass.’ Palmer, ‘The British press and euroscepticism: mirror or magnifying glass’. 
52 QA18.3, Eurobarometer 78, European Commission, December 2012. 
53 In the May 2014 European Parliamentary elections, UKIP made significant gains. ‘European 
Parliament Elections 2014’, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 14/32, June 11, 2014, p.2. 
For an excellent overview of the underlying reasons for the rise in Euroscepticism in Britain at the time 
(as well as France, Denmark and the Netherlands), see Gottfried, ‘Continental Drift: Understanding the 
Growth of Euroscepticism’. It then gained its first seats at Westminster following the defection of vtwo 
Conservative MPs.  Both cited immigration as a major concern that had driven their decisions. ‘It's 
time for change’, Douglas Carswell Blog, August 28, 2014; ‘Why I am leaving the Conservative party 
and joining UKIP’, Mark Reckless, September 27, 2014 < http://markreckless.com/2014/09/27/why-i-
am-leaving-the-conservative-party-and-joining-ukip/ >. (Last accessed 3 October 2016) 
enlargement. Rather than see expansion as the best way in which to stave off political 
union, it came to see enlargement as an immigration problem.54 As David Cameron 
stated: ‘As we contemplate countries like Serbia and Albania one day joining the EU 
we must find a way to slow down access to each other’s labour markets until we can be 
sure this will not cause vast migrations…I look forward to finding a way to continue 
with enlargement but in a way that regains the trust and support of our peoples.’55 While 
the official British position was to support enlargement,56 the reality was that as 
concerns over immigration became the primary policy focus, political support for 
enlargement was less strong than it once was.57 
 
What made the growing debate over immigration and enlargement so significant was 
the way in which it fed into the question of Britain’s continued membership of the EU.58 
Ever since the Conservatives had come to power, Eurosceptic members on the right-
wing of the party had pressed the case for a referendum on the issue. Coupled with the 
growing support for UKIP, Cameron had no choice but to bow to their wishes. In 
January 2013, he announced that if the Conservatives secured a majority in the next 
election, he would seek a ‘new settlement’ on Britain’s place in the EU and would then 
put the question of membership to a popular vote.59 In the period that followed, 
immigration and enlargement became increasingly central to the debate over any new 
relationship between Britain and the EU. A December 2013 poll, taken shortly before 
                                                     
54 ‘How the Tory right turned against EU enlargement’, The Guardian, December 21, 2013; ‘Once 
Tories’ answer to EU fears, enlargement is now their problem’, The Observer, December 30, 2013. 
55 ‘UK no longer advocates for EU enlargement’ Euractiv, December 21, 2013. Members of the 
government now made it ever clearer that there could no longer be an unfettered right of freedom of 
movement. Some measure would have to be introduced. For instance, one idea was that the freedom of 
movement from any new member would be limited until the per capita income of the new entrant 
reached a certain proportion of the EU average per capita income. 
56 ‘EU Enlargement’, House of Lords Hansard (Daily record of Parliament) Written Answers, Tuesday 
17 June 2014. Certainly, within the corridors of the Foreign Office there was still a commitment to 
enlargement. British official, comment to the author, October 2014. 
57 James Ker-Lindsay, ‘The United Kingdom’, p.57. 
58 ‘Goodbye Europe’, The Economist, December 12, 2012; ‘Cameron to threaten EU with British exit’, 
The Times, August 25, 2014. 
59 ‘EU speech at Bloomberg’, January 23, 2013. < https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-
speech-at-bloomberg > (Last accessed July 14, 2017). 
the transitional controls on Bulgarian and Romanian citizens was lifted, showed that 
British voters identified limits on new arrivals from elsewhere in the Union as the single 
most important issue that should be tackled in talks with EU.60 
 
On May 7, 2015, Britain held a general election. In a major political upset, the 
Conservatives defied expectations and won an outright victory. Cameron had to deliver 
on his manifesto promise to hold a vote on continued membership before 2017. Weeks 
later, the government introduced legislation for a referendum.61 In the meantime, the 
government negotiated a series of changes to the terms of British membership of the 
European Union.62 In February, it was announced that the referendum on EU 
membership would be held on June 23, 2016.63 
 
Turkey as an issue in the referendum campaign 
Although the official referendum campaign would not officially start until April 15, 
2016, the two sides set out their positions as soon as the date of the vote was announced. 
For the Remain campaign, attention would be focused on the economic benefits of 
staying in the European Union. In contrast, the Leave campaign sought to emphasise 
the argument that leaving the EU was about sovereignty – encapsulated in the slogan 
‘take back control’ – and immigration. Despite research showing that EU citizens in 
Britain were making an important contribution to the British economy and paying more 
in taxes than they were receiving in benefits,64 repeated claims were made that schools, 
hospitals and the country’s transport networks were unable to cope with so many new 
                                                     
60 ‘EU referendum: the red lines for swing voters’, YouGov, December 18, 2013. 
61 Full title: ‘An Act to make provision for the holding of a referendum in the United Kingdom and 
Gibraltar on whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union’, < 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/36/contents/enacted/data.htm > (Last accessed, July 14, 
2017)  
62 European Council meeting (February 18 and 19, 2016), Conclusions. 
63 ‘EU referendum: Cameron sets June date for UK vote’, BBC News, February 20, 2016. 
64 Dustmann and Frattini, ‘The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK’. 
arrivals.65 Others cast their views in more overtly xenophobic terms. Immigrants from 
the EU were portrayed as a threat to British values and culture. What would make all 
this particularly significant in the context of Turkey’s EU membership was that these 
arguments were also taking place at a time of rising anti-Muslim sentiment in the 
country. A series of high profile terrorist attacks in France and Belgium a few months 
earlier had led to a worrying rise in anti-Islamic sentiment in the country. Figures 
released by the police in December 2015 showed that attacks on Muslim targets had 
tripled following the Paris attacks.66  
 
It was against this general backdrop of growing concerns about immigration from the 
EU and a rise in anti-Islamic sentiment that Turkey first entered the referendum debate 
in an unexpectedly direct way. By convention, each major party is occasionally 
allocated time on the BBC, the public broadcast service, to make what is known as a 
party political broadcast.67 On February 2, over two months before the official start of 
the campaign, UKIP had its turn. Rather than repeat its long-held claims that the EU 
was holding the United Kingdom back from trade with the rest of the world, or that 
membership was an attack on British sovereignty and democracy, it devoted its entire 
three-and-a-half-minute broadcast to the danger posed by Turkish membership of the 
European Union.68 Emphasising the country’s size and its Muslim heritage, UKIP 
insisted that Turkey was just five years away from membership. The message was clear. 
Britain had to leave the EU before Turkey joined. Unsurprisingly, the broadcast 
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attracted significant criticism.69 Importantly, though, the broadcast watchdog 
(OFCOM) rejected accusations of racism.70 From then onwards, Turkey’s prospective 
membership of the European Union became a mainstay of UKIP’s Brexit campaign.71 
 
Although UKIP was a crucial protagonist in the overall campaign to leave the EU, it 
would not lead the efforts to secure Brexit. Instead, three main groups fought to run the 
campaign: Vote Leave, Grassroots Out (which was supported by UKIP) and Leave.EU 
(which was, confusingly, supported by UKIP’s leader, Nigel Farage). On April 13, two 
days before campaigning officially began, the Electoral Commission designated Vote 
Leave as the official leave campaign.72 This was significant. Comprised mainly of 
members of the Conservative Party – including prominent cabinet ministers, who had 
been given special exemption by the prime minister to campaign against the 
government on Brexit73 – it initially avoided focusing on immigration, and therefore on 
Turkey. Instead, it concentrated on making the economic case for Brexit. It emphasised 
the possibility of a free-trading Britain open to business with the wider world. The 
problem was that it was already becoming obvious that the official Remain campaign 
– named ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ or, more simply, ‘Stronger In’ – was winning the 
economic argument. As well as official British Government reports arguing that the 
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country would suffer outside the EU,74 various other international bodies, such as the 
IMF and the OECD, expected Brexit to have a negative effect on the British economy.75 
Meanwhile, various international leaders, including Barack Obama,76 and senior 
figures from Australia, New Zealand and Canada – the crucial ‘Old Commonwealth’ 
partners of the UK – expressed support for continued British membership of the EU.77 
 
Within days of the official start of the campaign, Vote Leave had lost the economic 
debate.78 It now saw no choice but to turn its attention to immigration.79 At this point, 
Turkey again came to the forefront of the debate. On May 20, Vote Leave published a 
report highlighting the intolerable strain Turkish membership of the EU would put on 
the National Health Service.80 Over the next few days, the campaign kept up its attacks 
on Turkey. Appearing on a prominent political programme, Penny Mordaunt, the 
Minister of State for the Armed Forces, and a prominent Leave campaigner, even 
argued that that Turkey posed a security threat to the European Union, and by extension 
Britain; even though it was a NATO member. More significantly, she insisted – wholly 
incorrectly – that the British Government did not have a veto over Turkey’s 
membership.81 Speaking hours later, on another talk show, Cameron refuted 
Mordaunt’s claims. He stressed that Britain, alongside every other EU member, could 
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block the accession of new members.82 However, he then went even further and took 
the opportunity to play down the possibility of Turkey’s membership, insisting that it 
would be, ‘literally decades before this even had a prospect of happening.’ Indeed, at 
the current rate of progress, Turkey would not be ready to join the bloc ‘until the year 
3000’.83 Undeterred, Vote Leave kept up the pressure. On May 23, it unveiled a 
controversial campaign poster showing a British passport against a red background, 
with the caption: ‘Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU’.84 This 
immediately led to accusations that the campaign was now pursuing an openly racist 
agenda aimed at vilifying Turks.85 
 
What made Vote Leave’s attempt to target Turkey especially significant was that a 
number of its leading supporters had previously been very positively disposed towards 
Turkey.86 Indeed, many key members of the campaign were part of the Conservative 
Friends of Turkey – a body that explicitly stated that one of its objectives was to lobby 
for Turkish EU membership.87 Perhaps the most prominent member of this group was 
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Boris Johnson, who had been Mayor of London until May 2016, and had emerged as 
the figurehead in the Leave campaign. As someone with Turkish ancestry – he is the 
great-grandson of Ali Kemal, who had served as Interior Minister in the Ottoman 
Government88 – he had always been a particularly strong supporter of Turkey’s EU 
membership and had previously called for greater respect and tolerance for Turkey.89 
Like others, he also avoided playing the Turkish EU card at the start.90 However, as the 
campaign wore on he too changed his position. In a co-signed letter to the prime 
minister, he called on Cameron to guarantee that Turkey would never join the EU and 
that Britain would promise to veto it.91 
 
As the campaign continued, the question of Turkey’s EU accession remained a central 
issue. During the first televised debate, Cameron was put on the spot by a young woman 
who asked how the UK could support Turkish membership, given that it ‘financed 
ISIS’. Again, he emphasised that according to the current pace of negotiations, it would 
not be ready to join until the year 3000.92 The next day, Vote Leave tweeted a picture 
of new EU offices and asked: ‘If Turkey isn’t joining the EU, why are there seats and 
interpreter booths built for them in the new EU building?’93 The message was 
deceptive. MEPs had in fact recently recommended that Turkish become an official 
language of the European Union at the request of the Cypriot Government, which had 
suggested the measure as a goodwill gesture towards Turkish Cypriots in the context 
                                                     
88 For a brief overview of Ali Kemal, see Norman Stone, ‘My Dream for Turkey, by Boris’s Great 
Grandfather’, The Spectator, April 23, 2008. 
89 Boris Johnson, ‘Why are we so afraid of Turkey?’, The Spectator, February 26, 2007 
90 When the matter came during a television interview he stated: ‘Frankly, I don’t mind whether Turkey 
joins the EU, provided the UK leaves the EU.’ Andrew Marr Show, BBC 1, June 5, 2016. Owen 
Bennet, ‘Boris Johnson: UK Population Will Hit 80 Million If We Stay in the EU’, Huffington Post, 
June 5, 2016. 
91 ‘Boris Johnson and Michael Gove demand David Cameron veto Turkey’s membership of the EU’, 
Daily Telegraph, June 16m 2016. In an act that many called hypocritical, just months later, after he 
was appointed foreign secretary, Johnson visited Ankara and promised to support Turkey’s EU bid. 
‘Boris Johnson accused of ‘Olympian hypocrisy’ for backing Turkey EU bid’, iNews, September 27, 
2016. 
92 ‘Feeling the heat, Prime Minister? Cameron sweats as he gets a mauling from voters over 
immigration, Project Fear and 'waffling' during first referendum TV debate’, Daily Mail, June 2, 2016. 
93 Tweet by @vote_leave, June 3, 2016 https://twitter.com/vote_leave/status/738666282288066560 
(Last accessed, July 14, 2017) 
of ongoing reunification efforts.94 It also released another controversial leaflet. 
Showing Turkey on a map alongside the other candidates for EU membership, and 
listing their populations, it also highlighted that Turkey’s neighbours included Iraq and 
Syria. The message was clear. Turkish membership would bring with it Middle East 
instability.95 
 
In the face of this unrelenting emphasis on Turkish membership, speculation mounted 
that Cameron was preparing to announce that Turkey would only be able to join the EU 
if the British people approved of its membership in a referendum.96 Certainly, there 
were those who felt that he should do so as this would undermine the Leave campaign, 
perhaps fatally.97 However, others urged caution, arguing that it would only add 
credibility to the claims that Turkey would join.98 Speaking before the House of 
Commons at his weekly Prime Minister’s Question, on 8 June, Cameron did not 
mention the matter. Nor was any such commitment made at any point during the rest 
of the campaign. 
 
As the campaign entered its final stretch, the focus on Turkey continued. On June 12, 
the penultimate Sunday of the campaign, The Sunday Times, an influential newspaper 
advocating Brexit, published a report suggesting that British diplomats had been 
‘secretly’ discussing the possibility of granting visa free travel to up to one million 
Turkish citizens, and that these plans were being kept under wraps until after the EU 
referendum.99 The Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, Philip Hammond and 
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They put it down to a ‘selective leak’.100 Nevertheless, Vote Leave quickly seized on 
the ‘revelation’. Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for Justice, claimed that the report 
was evidence that the British Government was ‘actively working towards Turkey 
joining the EU and Turkish citizens being able to travel throughout the EU.’101 At the 
same time, Priti Patel, another member of the government campaigning for Brexit, drew 
attention to a report by Migration Watch, an anti-immigration think tank, suggesting 
that Turkish EU membership would mean that an extra 100,000 people a year would 
come to Britain, thus taking annual immigration to 460,000.102 Once again, Cameron 
strongly repudiated all these claims: ‘There is no prospect of Turkey joining the EU in 
decades. You cannot find an expert on this subject – you’ve been quoting lots of experts 
– you cannot find one, because it’s not going to happen.’103 
 
Up until this point, Turkey, like many other EU members and candidate countries, had 
steered clear of becoming involved in the referendum debate. However, the 
increasingly strong tone taken by the sides now forced it to respond. Mevlüt Çavasoğlu, 
the Turkish Foreign Minister, argued that it was not ‘right’ that Turkish membership 
had become a central issue in the campaign. His country had never been a ‘burden’ on 
the EU.104 Others in Turkey were far more scathing. Speaking on the BBC, Ilnur Çevik, 
President Erdoğan’s chief adviser, said that his country had been ‘flabbergasted’ by 
Britain’s stand. Noting that the Turkish Government had thought that the prime minister 
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was its ‘chief supporter’ in its quest for EU membership, he said that Turkey now felt 
‘taken in’ by his stance. As he explained, ‘the way [Cameron is] putting it, “they were 
never going to get in anyway, we just said we’ll go along with them”, that kind of 
attitude is deeply hurting the Turks…it is very insincere.’ As for the claims that millions 
of Turkish citizens would try to enter the UK after accession, he repudiated these by 
asking, ‘why should we be flooding Britain? There’s no reason. Whatever exists in 
Britain also exists in Turkey. We’re not going to go there just because you produce 
Cadbury’s chocolate and Maltesers.’105 Meanwhile, on the day before the referendum, 
President Erdoğan even waded into the debate, albeit indirectly. Launching a scathing 
attack on the way in which the EU was treating Turkey, and accusing it of not wanting 
a ‘Muslim-majority country’, he even suggested that Turkey might consider holding its 
own referendum on whether to continue EU accession talks.106 
 
Despite all this, the Leave campaign kept up the message about Turkey’s membership, 
and Britain’s support for it, to the very end. The day before the referendum, The Daily 
Mail, a leading Eurosceptic newspaper, claimed that the Government was ‘lying’ to the 
British public over Turkey’s membership of the EU and that plans had been drawn up 
to reopen Turkish membership talks in the week immediately after the referendum. It 
also seized on the comments made by Çevik that Britain had been at the forefront of 
efforts to see Turkey joint the Union. As Ian Duncan Smith, another prominent member 
of the Leave Campaign, and a former leader of the Conservative party, put it:  
 
David Cameron has repeatedly claimed that Turkey is not going to join the EU, 
despite it being Government policy. Now the Turkish government has 
confirmed that he is the “chief supporter” of their bid to join the EU…I’m afraid 
                                                     
105 ‘Turkey Entry to EU: Newsnight Ilnur Cevik Interview’, BBC Newsnight, 21 June 2016. < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjNnpWy-vXI > (Last accessed, 24 October 2016.) 
106 ‘Turkey could hold UK-style referendum on stalled EU bid: Erdoğan’, Hurriyet Daily News, June 
23, 2016. 
there is no conclusion you can draw from this except that David Cameron is 
colluding with the EU and lying to the British people. Families are suffering the 
consequences of uncontrolled migration.107  
 
On June 23, Britain voted to leave the European Union. 
 
Conclusion 
There were many factors that appeared to play a part in the decision by the United 
Kingdom to vote to leave the European Union. What exactly drove the final decision 
will inevitably be a point of dispute amongst analysts and scholars in the years ahead. 
However, a poll of 12,369 people carried out on the day of the vote, indicated that 
immigration, incorporating freedom of movement, appears to have been the deciding 
factor for one third of those who voted to leave the EU.108 Given that Turkey was cited 
considerable more than any other country in articles about immigration during the 10 
weeks of the referendum campaign, and that ‘the most negative depictions of non-UK 
nationals were of Turks and Albanians’,109 it therefore seems almost inevitable that the 
question of Turkish membership of the European Union influenced, to some degree or 
another, the decision of Britain to vote to leave the EU.  
 
Although few may have expected the topic of Turkish membership to have gained such 
a prominent position in the campaign, in retrospect it should not have been so 
surprising. After all, it tied into two key themes that had emerged prior to the vote. 
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Turkey was cited in a total of 461 articles, as compared to Poland (254), Albania (171), Romania (148), 
Bulgaria (93) and Hungary (28). 
Firstly, it was directly linked with the wider issue of freedom of movement and 
immigration. Secondly, and more controversially, it played into the anti-Islamic and 
xenophobic views of a section of British society. Turkey was also presented as a source 
of instability, most notably by drawing attention to its proximity to Syria and Iraq.  
 
What is perhaps surprising is the way in which the Leave campaign was willing to make 
assertions about Turkey’s membership prospects that it knew were wholly unfounded. 
While Turkey was a nominal candidate for European Union membership, it was already 
clear that its hopes of joining the EU in anything other than the long-term had long 
since disappeared. Across the European Union, popular and political support for 
Turkish membership had declined significantly. There were few, if any, European 
leaders and policy makers who viewed Turkish membership as a realistic prospect, and 
fewer still who were willing to openly advocate membership in anything other than the 
long-term. Likewise, within Turkey there appeared to be far less of an appetite for 
membership than had once been the case. More to the point, President Erdoğan 
appeared to have understood that EU demands for more democratic accountability 
posed a challenge to his personal rule and that of this party. Although, the refugee crisis 
has seen the opening of further accession chapters, this was largely understood to be a 
cosmetic concession by the EU to allow Erdoğan to maintain the pretence that Turkey 
was still a viable candidate to bolster his domestic standing. All things considered, the 
Leave campaign’s claims that Turkey was on the cusp of EU membership, and could 
join as early as 2020, was patently false.  
 
As for the claim that Britain remained a staunch supporter of Turkish membership of 
the European Union, this is a rather more complicated claim to deconstruct. While it is 
notionally correct that the British Government remained a supporter of Turkish 
membership, this claim must be put in context of the waning British support for EU 
enlargement more generally and the EU’s position on Turkey. In truth, the widening 
over deepening stance that had guided British policy for many decades had, by the time 
of the referendum, given way to strong misgivings over the potential rise in immigration 
following any further expansion. Meanwhile, it was also clear to London that Turkey 
had no chance of ever joining the Union. As Craig Oliver, David Cameron’s Director 
of Communications, noted in his account of the campaign, the prime minister knew that 
Turkey would ‘never’ join the EU, not least of all because France had promised a 
referendum on the matter.110 All this would appear to suggest that British policy of 
supporting Turkey’s membership was more for show than a reflection of genuine 
determination to see Turkey in the EU.  
 
If this was the case, then why did Cameron not seize the opportunity to put the matter 
to rest and announce that Britain would not allow Turkey to join without a referendum? 
One could argue that such a move would have been futile. Many would have written it 
off as an insincere and cynical political stunt to win over Leave voters. It may even 
have done more harm than good to the Remain campaign as there was the risk that it 
would have lent credence to the Leave campaign’s arguments that Turkish membership 
was a genuine prospect. For his part, Oliver argues that Cameron did not take the step 
for ‘diplomatic reasons’.111 In truth, such a move would have been highly damaging to 
bilateral British-Turkish relations. Although the United Kingdom may not have been 
as strongly in favour of enlargement as it had been in the past, Britain and Turkey 
nevertheless maintain strong ties. These would have been put under extreme strain, if 
not jeopardised altogether, had Britain turned so strongly against Turkish membership. 
Sadly, the irony is that, even without this step, the vociferous way in which David 
Cameron was forced to downplay Turkey’s prospects of EU membership so strongly, 
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while avoiding closing the option off altogether, meant that bilateral relations were 
damaged anyway. Moreover, after everything he had said during the campaign, had 
Remain won, and the UK did not start the process of leaving the EU, it seems almost 
certain that Cameron would have had no choice but to take a more negative approach 
towards Turkey’s EU accession in the future. 
 
At a more general level, Turkey’s emergence as a central issue in the Brexit referendum 
was an important insight into the way in which, given the right circumstances, the 
potent mix of immigration, enlargement and freedom of movement could fuel 
nationalism and xenophobia to such devastating effect. While it remains to be seen 
whether this combination of issues will gain prominence in other member states in the 
same way it did in Britain in 2016, there can be no doubt that the question of Turkey’s 
EU accession – as misrepresented as it was – played a part in bringing about the United 
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